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The Samurai Next Door: Chinese Examinations  
of the Japanese Martial Spirit
Oleg Benesch
Introduction 1
Japan is a martial country, while China emphasizes civil virtues. This 
characterization has colored views of the two societies for centuries, 
reinforced by apparent differences in their traditional forms of premodern 
government, with Japan ruled by warriors while China maintained a scholarly 
examination system. Japan’s successful repulsion of the Mongol leets in 
the thirteenth century, as well as Toyotomi Hideyoshi’s (1536/1537-1598) 
devastating invasion of Korea at the end of the sixteenth century, further 
reinforced this perception. The view of a martial and warlike Japan was carried 
into the modern age, where it fed into the emerging discourse on bushidō, 2 
or “the way of the samurai/warrior,” which began to be popularized around 
the time of the Sino-Japanese War of 1894-1895. Rather than a continuation 
of an ancient tradition or a manifestation of a “national character,” however, 
bushidō is largely a modern invention, interpretations of which have tended 
to relect the conditions under which they were formulated. In this way, the 
samurai spirit has at times been credited for Japan’s economic success and 
technological progress, but also associated with militaristic imperialism. 
During the long conlict with China between 1931 and 1945, bushidō was a 
core tenet of militaristic “spiritual education” in Japan and came to symbolize 
Japanese aggression abroad.
In China, bushidō, or “wushidao”as the word is read in pinyin, has played 
an important role in shaping views of Japan from the late nineteenth century 
1. The author owes a debt of gratitude to Nathan Hopson, Jon Howlett, Ran Zwigenberg, 
and the anonymous reviewers for EOEO for their insightful comments on various 
drafts of this article.
2. 武士道
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onward, as the period of bushidō’s greatest growth and popularization 
coincided with an unprecedented inlux of Chinese students, reformers, and 
exiles to Japan. Chinese intellectuals credited bushidō with driving the 1868 
Meiji Restoration and subsequent reforms, while students at Japanese civilian 
and military schools were exposed to the increasingly pervasive bushidō 
ideology promoted by the imperial government. This was not the only bushidō, 
however, and Japanese discourse on the subject has always been highly diverse. 
Similarly, Chinese writers on bushidō soon moved beyond Japanese models 
to redeine the ethic to their own ends, which often related more closely to 
reforming China and managing Japanese activities than they did to objective 
scholarship. Writing in 1927, the prominent Guomindang (Chinese Nationalist 
Party) leader Dai Jitao (1891-1949) argued the necessity for Chinese to study 
Japan, invoking the legendary strategist Sun Wu (Sun Zi): “If you know 
yourself and you know your enemy, all of your battles will be victories.” For 
their part, Dai wrote, the Japanese studied China in great depth, publishing 
countless books and articles on the subject. 3 According to Dai, the notion that 
there was no value in studying Japan because it only borrowed ideas from 
other countries was most misguided, and knowledge of Japan was essential for 
China’s future. 4 For Dai, bushidō was one of the most important explanatory 
tools for understanding the dynamics of Japanese culture and society, relecting 
its high proile among both Japanese and foreigners as the “animating spirit” 
and even “soul” of Japan. During and after the Second Sino-Japanese War 
that ended in 1945, perceptions of bushidō in China were overwhelmingly 
negative, to the extent that the subject was discussed at all. Interest in bushidō 
began to grow again in the 1980s, relecting not only the greater openness 
of Chinese scholarship in the Reform Era, but also mirroring a resurgence in 
bushidō discourses in Japan and the West at the time.
Bushidō continues to ill this role in China today, and recent diplomatic 
tensions have contributed to a tremendous increase in Chinese studies of 
bushidō over the last two decades. Separate international conferences in 
Beijing and Taiwan in 2009 brought together over one hundred scholars from 
throughout the region and beyond to exchange views on bushidō. 5 Hundreds 
of books and articles on the subject have appeared during this time, many 
of which posit bushidō as a possible explanation for a supposedly “innate” 
3. Dai (2011): 4.
4. Hatakeyama (2013): 315.
5. “Chū Nichi Kan ni okeru bushid  no kenkyū,” held at the Beijing Center for Japanese 
Studies (Beijing Riben xue yanjiu zhonxin) on Feb. 15, 2009; “DongYa shiye zhong de 
Riben wushidao yu wenhua,” held at National Taiwan University on March 7, 2009.
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or “traditional” Japanese militarism. According to this view, which has 
considerable implications for reconciliation and inter-cultural relations, even 
if Japanese thinkers appropriated Chinese thought when formulating bushidō, 
they either misunderstood or intentionally distorted it to create an ideology of 
militarism.Another body of work tends to focus on the positive inluence of 
bushidō on Japan’s development, while simultaneously stressing the supposed 
Chinese heritage of the ethic. Positive assessments of bushidō focus on the 
Chinese religious and philosophical inluences that supposedly drove Japan’s 
successful modernization, while simultaneously downplaying the relationship 
between bushidō and militarism. Chinese publications on bushidō over the last 
thirty years accept bushidō as an ancient tradition, rather than acknowledging 
its modern character, and typically follow theoretical models established by 
Dai Jitao and others in the early twentieth century.
While the overtly martial overtones of Dai’s exhortation to study Japan 
may seem less immediately relevant, his selection of the maxim quoted above 
is most itting. There is a tendency in Chinese bushidō discourse, especially 
among popular works, to only consciously consider half of the maxim—
“know your enemy”—when, in fact, the content of speciic bushidō theories 
often reveals a great deal more about contemporary China, or perhaps Sino-
Japanese relations, than it does about Japanese culture, society, or history. 
This is not unique to China, and in both Japan and the West, the vast majority 
of works on bushidō have traditionally been more relective of the social, 
political, and economic conditions under which they were written, rather than 
objective studies of the samurai or their ethics. At the same time, as Japan’s 
most important foreign “other,” China played a crucial role in the formative 
period of bushidō in modern Japan, and continues to inluence its development 
in Japan today.
In this context, bushidō has served as a barometer of nationalism and the 
development of national identities in Japan and China, as its origins were 
hotly debated in both countries. While Japanese promoters of bushidō often 
sought to minimize the perceived signiicance of Chinese thought in Japan, 
Chinese thinkers have frequently portrayed bushidō as being based primarily 
on “Chinese” Buddhist and Confucian ideals. Individuals who domestically 
criticized or dismissed these traditional thought systems as irrelevant to modern 
China often continued to claim them defensively as part of a broader Chinese 
heritage that had supposedly been appropriated by Japan. These responses, 
which were also conditioned by shifts in Sino-Japanese relations, can help 
trace the ebb and low of cultural nationalism and notions of Chinese identity 
over the past century.
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The development of bushidō
The formulation and development of bushidō in modern Japan was very 
much a product of the unique dynamics of the Meiji period (1868-1912), which 
saw dramatic changes in government, society, and popular culture. A large-
scale drive towards Westernization in the 1870s was followed by a backlash in 
the form of a Confucian revival in education, culminating in the promulgation 
of the Imperial Rescript on Education in 1890. Although the Confucian ideals 
promoted at this time were heavily inluenced by those that dominated the 
preceding Edo period (1603-1868), the association of Confucianism with 
China meant that their popularity waned as views of the neighboring Qing 
dynasty (1644-1912) deteriorated. As Matsuzawa Hiroaki argues, Japanese 
experiences of China from the 1860s on into the early twentieth century were 
heavily colored by Western points of view, as many travellers to the continent 
sailed on Western ships, stayed in the foreign legations in Hong Kong and 
Shanghai, and obtained knowledge of Chinese political events from European 
newspapers. 6 In the climate of burgeoning Japanese nationalism that marked 
the last decade of the nineteenth century, these factors contributed to a lowering 
of contemporary China’s status, which was dealt further blows by Japan’s 
victory in the Sino-Japanese War and intervention in the Boxer War (1900-01).
These currents led to an increased desire for new, “national” ideologies 
that were more clearly based on Japan’s own history and traditions, albeit with 
at least one eye on foreign models. Bushidō was perhaps the most prominent 
and inluential product of this process, and certainly the one with the greatest 
staying power. Although samurai did concern themselves with ethical thought 
before this time, it was highly diverse and varied greatly by time period, region, 
and individual, and it was only after the Sino-Japanese War that a martial ethic 
with a national scope came to be developed. The term “bushidō” was no more 
than an obscure literary relic and very rarely used before 1895, and in this 
study refers exclusively to the modern ideology. 7 Rather than a continuation of 
an ancient tradition, bushidō evolved as a response to modernizing trends and 
was subsequently promoted by both government and private thinkers in order 
to promote patriotism and national unity.
With regard to the samurai class with which bushidō is typically associated, 
their condition had been recognized as a major problem for several decades 
before the Meiji period, and reforming the samurai was one of the new 
government’s most pressing and divisive issues. The unsustainability of the 
6. Matsuzawa (1993): 167-170.
7. For an overview of the etymology of bushidō, see Benesch (2011): 5-14.
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samurai in their traditional state was already clear to many in Japan before 1868, 
and suggestions included putting them to work in farming or other industries. 
The overpowering military strength of the foreign powers further demonstrated 
that the samurai were not it for purposes of national defense, and one of the 
irst tasks of the Meiji government was to create a new conscripted army on 
the European model. A series of reforms in the 1870s stripped the samurai of 
their traditional privileges such as the wearing of swords and, perhaps more 
importantly, eliminated their stipends. Many samurai were angered by the 
drastic changes to their livelihood and identity, and this discontent combined 
with other, more widespread grievances, boiling over in a number of uprisings 
in the 1870s. The largest of these, the Satsuma Rebellion of 1877, was centered 
on a large group of disaffected samurai gathered around the Restoration hero 
Saig  Takamori (1828-1877) and could only be put down by the government 
at great cost and with considerable loss of life.
By the late 1880s, the image of the former samurai class had become 
quite negative in broader society, as the former commoner classes continued 
to resent their erstwhile superiors. Although some ex-samurai were quite 
successful and powerful, many others had trouble adjusting to the new order 
and fell on hard times. The phrase “samurai business practice” (bushi no 
shōhō) was a popular descriptor for failed entrepreneurship, and newspaper 
editorials criticized destitute former samurai or asked for sympathy on their 
behalf. The rebellions of the 1870s were widely viewed as samurai revolts 
against the state, and the notion that the samurai were more trouble than they 
were worth was widespread. This was an unlikely climate for the birth of a 
national ethic based on the obsolete warrior class.
In this light, the irst discussions of samurai ethics occurred around 1890 
among a diverse group of intellectuals who were bound by a common interest 
in Western thought and history. In the context of bushidō, the most inluential 
ideal was the English gentleman, who illed the pages of the translated Victorian 
moralistic tomes that were so popular in the early and mid-Meiji periods. In the 
late nineteenth century, the British Empire served as a model for many aspiring 
societies, and the idea that virtues of gentlemanship and chivalry were the 
secret behind the empire’s strength and prosperity were widespread. This trope 
was promoted in no small way by the English themselves, often in combination 
with Social Darwinist theories and notions of racial superiority. Victorian 
gentlemanship was seen as the direct heritage of medieval knighthood, which 
lent it a connection with supposedly ancient traditions that served as an anchor 
in a rapidly changing world. English knighthood and gentlemanship became 
points of interest in many other countries, including Germany, the United 
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States, and Japan, where the latter term was rendered “jentorumanshippu,” 
and is still widely understood today.
A number of Japanese thinkers in the early 1890s sought to introduce a 
similar ethic to idealized gentlemanship into Japan, and saw the former samurai 
class as a vehicle by which this could be accomplished. If medieval knights 
could serve as the basis for English gentlemanship, Japan’s equivalent “feudal 
knighthood,” the samurai, or bushi, could serve for a native gentlemanship, or 
bushidō. The most signiicant early formulation of these ideals was in articles 
published by the journalist and politician Ozaki Yukio (1858-1954) during and 
after a journey to England. According to Ozaki, “The nature of that which is 
called gentlemanship in English is truly like this. In English, gentlemanly and 
ungentlemanly are two words, and verily they decide the failure and success 
of a man. In our country, being labeled with the word bushi should also have 
the same force. Does not the old proverb state that ‘as the lower is the cherry 
blossom, the man is a bushi’?” 8 Ozaki’s ideas were subsequently echoed by a 
number of other thinkers in the early 1890s, and bushidō discourse grew slowly 
before success in the Sino-Japanese War gave the concept a great boost. 9
Throughout the world, Japan’s victory over China in 1895 was widely seen 
as a demonstration of the more successful implementation of Western reforms 
and technology by Japan relative to China. Images from the war portrayed 
Japan’s military in Western ways, as opposed to garish and colorful “oriental” 
Chinese troops, and superior use of modern military drill and structures was 
widely credited with deciding the war in Japan’s favor. 10 The discussions of 
bushidō that emerged around the time of the war were not ostensibly militaristic, 
but instead focused on virtues such as nationalism, diligence, and duty, which 
were seen as having given Japan the ability to adapt modern military methods. 
After the war, however, Japan’s success led to a new type of bushidō discourse 
as national conidence and anti-foreign sentiment grew following a heavy-
handed Triple Intervention by France, Germany, and Russia that greatly 
reduced Japan’s war gains. In an 1896 article on “Our Recent Chauvinism,” 
the American-educated Christian Nitobe Inaz  (1862-1933) defended the new 
currents: “No wonder that reaction has lately been started against undue respect 
for European civilization.… Unhappy the nation, which succumbs without a 
groan,—with neither power nor will to assert its claims.… We cannot deny 
that we are a sensitive people. We have been so trained. Sensitiveness is a trait 
of samuraism, of bushidō.… A sensitive nation can never bear to have itself 
8. Ozaki (1893): 25-28.
9. For an examination of the development of bushidō, see: Benesch (2014): chapter 2.
10. Saya (2011): 38-42.
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placed in an inferior position.” 11 Nationalistic groups, many of which were tied 
to the rapidly proliferating martial arts organizations, picked up bushidō and 
reinterpreted it in increasingly chauvinistic ways. The Christian leader Uemura 
Masahisa (1858-1925) criticized these shifts in mainstream bushidō discourse, 
lamenting that the concept had been hijacked by insipid false patriots. 12
Over the course of the next twenty years, bushidō became a household 
word, inding broad acceptance both in Japan and abroad, the latter especially 
through the book Bushido: The Soul of Japan, written by Nitobe Inaz  in 
English in 1899 and published the following year. Bushidō became a common 
theme in literature, politics, and sports, as well as both civilian and military 
education, being reinterpreted to suit various goals over the course of the last 
century. As there is no accepted deinition of the tenets of bushidō, individual 
thinkers have been largely free to promote their own interpretations, using 
carefully selected examples from history to support their contentions. Where 
one bushidō interpretation may rely on certain eighteenth-century texts to stress 
the virtue of loyalty, another may call upon medieval history to demonstrate 
the lack of loyalty among Japanese warriors.
The development of bushidō was strongly inluenced by a nationalistic 
desire for a uniquely Japanese ethic free from foreign inluences, and the 
pre-1894 theories were later ignored due to their perceived overemphasis on 
European models. In a 1901 essay on bushidō, for example, Tokyo Imperial 
University philosophy professor Inoue Tetsujir  (1855-1944) claimed that 
bushidō was far superior to European chivalry, dismissing the latter as mere 
“woman-worship.” 13 Chinese inluence on Japan’s intellectual traditions was 
more dificult to ignore, as many of the most fundamental concepts in religious 
and philosophical thought had their origins in Confucian and Buddhist ideals, 
and the widespread view of China as superior to Japan arguably lasted until the 
Sino-Japanese War. 14 One of the most important tasks for bushidō theorists in 
the early twentieth century was to downplay the supposed Chinese inluence on 
the ideology as much as possible in order to make it comprehensively Japanese. 
Signiicantly, the early formulators of bushidō in the 1890s had already moved 
away from China and towards the West for inspiration. After spending two 
months in Shanghai in 1884 to report on a conlict between China and France, 
Ozaki Yukio claimed to have been convinced of China’s inferiority, as well 
as the need for Japan to intervene on the continent. Inoue Tetsujir , far and 
11. Nitobe (1896): 22.
12. Ashina (2008): 15-16.
13. Inoue (1901a): 6-7.
14. Keene (1971): 125-126.
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away the most inluential promoter of bushidō in the period before 1945, built 
his bushidō theories around selected writings of the strategist Yamaga Sok  
(1622-1685), who disparaged contemporary China and relocated the moral 
center of the world to Japan. Yamaga also promoted ideals of imperial loyalty, 
and nationalistic factors weighed more on Inoue’s decision to focus on Yamaga 
than did his actual writings on samurai ethics. 15
In addition to using the writings of anti-Chinese Confucians, Inoue 
deined the character of Confucianism within bushidō by displacing the 
traditional orthodoxy of the Song-era neo-Confucian Zhu Xi (1130-1200) 
with the work of the Ming neo-Confucian Wang Yangming (1472-1529). The 
teachings of Zhu Xi were at the core of the oficial Tokugawa academy, as 
well as the majority of domain schools, during the Edo period, where they 
were intended to provide the ostensibly martial samurai with the education 
of virtuous Confucian scholar-gentlemen. Although Tokugawa intellectual 
life was highly diverse, the privileged position of Zhu Xi’s teachings meant 
that they were closely associated with the ancien régime in the Meiji period. 
In contrast, Wang Yangming, whose ideas were often posited as the primary 
neo-Confucian heterodoxy to Zhu Xi, came to be seen as the driving force 
behind anti-Tokugawa movements. In the Meiji period, the teachings of 
Wang Yangming became more popular than ever before, with a wide variety 
of individuals who had resisted the Tokugawa posthumously recast as his 
students. This characterization was rarely supported by any evidence, as even 
activists, rebels, and adventurers with little interest in any sort of Confucian 
thought were portrayed as studious followers of Wang Yangming. 16 As Nitobe 
Inaz  wrote in Bushido: The Soul of Japan,
Bushido made light of knowledge as such. It was not pursued as an end in itself, but 
as a means to the attainment of wisdom. Hence, he who stopped short of this end 
was regarded no higher than a convenient machine, which could turn out poems and 
maxims at bidding. Thus, knowledge was conceived as identical with its practical 
application in life; and this Socratic doctrine found its greatest exponent in the 
Chinese philosopher, Wan Yang Ming [sic], who never wearies of repeating, “To 
know and to act are one and the same.” 17
As Nitobe indicated, most references to Wang Yangming in this context 
focused on two core concepts: the idea that humans have innate knowledge of 
15. Tucker (2002).
16. Benesch (2009).
17. Nitobe (1904): 16.
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the good, and that knowledge and action were inseparable. The combination of 
these elements was especially attractive for aspiring revolutionaries (and their 
later biographers) as it vindicated their actions against authority by appealing 
to the higher authority of the innately-known good. Discussions of Wang’s 
thought in this context did not often go beyond stating these basic tenets and 
claiming their supposed inluence on certain historical igures, as the paucity 
of supporting documentary evidence also hindered the development of more 
extensive arguments.
Inoue Tetsujir  also focused on Wang Yangming, crediting his thought with 
having strengthened bushidō and aided in its codiication, and the irst volume 
of Inoue’s major study of Japanese Confucian thought was dedicated to 
Wang’s teachings. 18 According to Inoue, the prominent Westernizer Fukuzawa 
Yukichi (1835-1901) was mistaken in blaming the recent defeat of the Qing 
on Confucianism, arguing instead that it was precisely the disappearance of 
Confucianism in China that led to this disaster. 19 This relected the widespread 
notion that Wang’s heritage had been neglected in China, while contributing 
to Japan’s success, an idea that would also gain broad currency in China in 
the early twentieth century. As Takeda Kiyoko argues, Sun Yat-sen (Sun Wen; 
1866-1925) was inspired by the understanding of the Meiji Restoration as 
caused by “men of action” driven by their martial bushidō spirit, which was 
built on Wang’s unity of knowledge and action. 20 Ultimately, chauvinistic 
views typically won out in discussions of the Confucian inluence on bushidō, 
however, as they often would in later Chinese discourse on the subject, albeit 
with very different conclusions. As Nitobe Inaz  wrote, “As to strictly ethical 
doctrines, the teachings of Confucius were the most proliic source of Bushido. 
His enunciation of the ive moral relations… was but a conirmation of what the 
race instinct had recognized before his writings were introduced from China,” 
alleging that Japan had very little intellectual debt to China in this regard. 21
Chinese in Japan during the bushidō boom
Along with the growth of bushidō discourse, the decade following the Sino-
Japanese War also saw a tremendous inlux of Chinese students, activists, and 
reformers. The necessity for reform in China was driven home by the defeat 
18. Inoue (1900).
19. Inoue (1901b): 97-98.
20. Takeda (1978): 153.
21. Nitobe (1904: 14.
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to Japan, and thousands of students were sent to study abroad. China’s recent 
adversary was the most popular destination, given Japan’s own seemingly 
successful experience of modernization and the short geographical distance. 
Perhaps most importantly, the similarity of the written languages made it far 
easier for Chinese to read Japanese texts than Western ones, including the many 
annotated translations of the latter. The scale of this transfer of knowledge 
through the medium of the Japanese language can be seen in the many terms 
in modern Chinese that were originally Japanese translations of Western 
concepts, including “civilization,” “economics,” “philosophy,” and many 
more. At the same time, there was great interest in the “Asian” backgrounds 
of Japan’s progress, as these were believed to be most immediately relevant to 
the Chinese situation, and bushidō was one of the most widely-cited concepts 
in this context.
For their part, many groups and individuals in Japan were keen to provide 
support to the arriving Chinese, who were seen as strugglers against an unjust 
and despotic order similar to that which Japan had overcome in the 1860s. 
More pragmatically, the elite students and political exiles were accurately 
viewed as potential leaders of a future reformed China, and it seemed prudent 
to secure their goodwill and inluence at this early stage. The inluential 
nationalistic Dark Ocean Society (Gen’y sha) around Toyama Mitsuru 
(1855-1944), for example, sought close links with anti-Qing igures such as 
Sun Yat-sen and Liang Qichao (1873-1929) during their time in Japan. The 
Gen’y sha were heavily engaged in the coal trade with China, but dificulties 
negotiating with the Qing government led them to give support to exiled 
reformers and revolutionaries. 22 The ultranationalistic bushidō theorist Suzuki 
Chikara (Tengan; 1867-1926) was a prominent member of the Gen’y sha and 
a founder of the more extreme expansionist Amur River Society (Kokuryūkai), 
and photographs of Suzuki with Sun during the latter’s visits to Nagasaki attest 
to their personal relationship.
Bushidō was a popular theme among the nationalistic groups that sought 
out Chinese exiles, exposing the latter to the conceptbefore it had reached 
mainstream discourse in much of Japan. Through this dynamic, the irst 
writings on bushidō by Chinese authors appeared soon after the Sino-Japanese 
War, initiating a parallel bushidō discourse in the Sinophone literature that 
has carried on to the present day. One of the irst signiicant texts on bushidō 
was written by Liang Qichao, who led to Japan in 1898 after the failure of 
the 100 Days Reform and spent the next fourteen years in exile with Japan 
as his primary base. The year following his arrival, Liang published the brief 
22. Chae (2002): 173.
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article “What of the Spirit of China?” (“Zhongguohun an zaihu”), in which he 
extolled the virtues of bushidō and its inluence on the Japanese national spirit: 
“Among things the Japanese often speak of, there is the so-called Japanese 
spirit, and there is so-called bushidō. And what is this Japanese spirit? It is 
bushidō. This is the reason Japan was able to found and restore the country.” 23
In China, Liang lamented, it was not possible to ind such a national spirit 
or to encourage martial virtues among the people, many of whom viewed 
soldiers as no different from slaves. There was no patriotism or trust between 
the government and people, and Liang desired something akin to bushidō 
for China. The soldiers of China did not have any spirit, he criticized, and 
“Soldiers without spirit are the same as not having soldiers at all. Today, the 
most essential thing is to manufacture a Chinese spirit. What is this Chinese 
spirit? It is the soldier spirit. If one has soldiers with spirit, the country has 
spirit. The things known as patriotism and self-respect result in the soldier 
spirit.” 24 Liang acknowledged elsewhere that the demand for absolute loyalty 
inherent in bushidō could make it “damaging to the social order,” but irmly 
believed that China needed to create a patriotic and martial spirit similar 
to bushidō in order to reform the country, as the courage and sellessness it 
inspired made it a valuable ethic. 25
Liang made several trips abroad to destinations including North America 
and Australia over the next few years, always returning to Japan where bushidō 
discourse was becoming increasingly prominent. He addressed the subject in 
a number of articles, such as his 1903 “On Militarism” (“Lun xiangwu”), and 
was increasingly involved in Japanese debates. 26 Here, perhaps the greatest 
inluence on Liang’s ideas was Inoue Tetsujir , who used his position as a 
prominent academic to ensure that his nationalistic and imperialistic bushidō 
swiftly became the orthodox interpretation in Japan. Liang and Inoue had a 
close relationship, and Liang’s writings on bushidō clearly relect Inoue’s 
arguments. 27 While Chinese ideas typically received only limited and qualiied 
credit in the works of most Japanese bushidō theorists in the twentieth century, 
Japanese acknowledgement of Wang Yangming’s supposed inluence, in 
particular, inspired Liang and many other Chinese in Japan at the time. 28
23. Liang (1988b).
24. Liang (1988b).
25. “Ziyou Shu,” cited in Yuan (2011): 210.
26. Liang (1988a) cited in: Lan (2011): 71.
27. Sueoka (1999): 180; Chen (2009): 221-222.
28. Ogyū (1995): 427.
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Liang, whose thoughts on bushidō had been gradually developing over the 
past ive years, seized on the idea that Chinese teachings were at the heart 
of bushidō, and in 1904 published his most signiicant work on the subject, 
China’s Bushidō (Zhongguo zhi wushidao). Liang opened this book by 
relecting on the shame that he and other Chinese felt when Westerners and 
Japanese remarked that China had no martial history, and that the “Chinese 
race was not a martial race.” 29 Throughout Liang’s writings on bushidō, he 
fought against the perceived “bookish weakness” of Chinese society relative 
to Japan and the West. 30 In China’s Bushidō, Liang continued this trend, but 
now argued that this was a more recent phenomenon, and that China had once 
possessed a proud martial tradition that it should call upon to strengthen the 
nation in this time of crisis. To this end, Liang cited examples from Chinese 
history to demonstrate the nation’s own wushidao, beginning with the military 
character of the uniication processes in China that brought the country together 
from “10,000 states” to a single one. 31 According to Liang, China’s martial 
tradition grew strong during the Spring and Autumn period and continued 
through the Warring States period until the end of the Han dynasty, covering 
a span of roughly a millennium from the eighth century B.C.E. onward. This 
ancient martial spirit enabled the Chinese to resist foreign barbarians for many 
centuries, Liang reasoned, and three thousand years earlier, the Chinese had 
been the “most martial of races.” 32 Unfortunately, Liang wrote, this wushidao 
spirit disappeared with the Han, and China’s martial heritage was forgotten. 33
Having witnessed the rapid development and dissemination of bushidō 
in Japan, Liang intended China’s Bushidō to have a similar effect in China. 
Referring to it as a textbook that should be used throughout the country to 
“promote the martial spirit” and to “stimulate children’s brains,” Liang 
based the text around textual and anecdotal examples from Chinese history 
designed to awaken his readers to their martial roots. 34 Signiicantly, Liang 
made almost no mention of Japan in this text after the irst few lines of the 
foreword, and Japanese bushidō ostensibly served only as an inspiration rather 
than a concrete ethic to be imported. In his preface to China’s Bushidō, Liang’s 
friend, the later politician Yang Du (1875-1931), recounted that he was puzzled 
by the title of the work. According to Yang, when he questioned Liang about 
29. Liang (1904): “Zixu”: 1.
30. Hatakeyama (2013): 318.
31. Liang (1904): 1-2.
32. Liang (1904): “Zixu”: 8-11.
33. Liang (1904): “Fanli”: 3.
34. Liang (1904): “Fanli”: 1-2.
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the use of the term bushidō, which referred to the unique Japanese ethic, Liang 
responded that while this was true, bushidō was at its heart no different from 
the Western way of “Humanity” or ancient Chinese ideals. Yang took this 
line of reasoning further, speculating that since bushidō consisted primarily 
of a fusion of Confucianism and Buddhism, it could be said to be a uniquely 
Chinese concept. 35
The difference in Liang and Yang’s approaches to bushidō relected 
in this exchange was largely predicated on the situation in which they irst 
encountered the subject. Liang had arrived in Japan at a time when bushidō 
was still very much in lux, and witnessed its development and establishment 
as an important national ideology. The relatively recent vintage of bushidō 
and the “Japanese spirit” was apparent to Liang, leading him to propose the 
“manufacture” of a similar spirit in China, even using the same terminology. In 
contrast, by the time Yang arrived in Japan in 1902, bushidō had a considerably 
higher proile and was being promoted by prominent igures such as Inoue 
Tetsujir . In this context, a signiicant shift in the character of bushidō discourse 
occurred when Inoue introduced Edo-period texts by Yamaga Sok , Yoshida 
Sh in (1830-1859), and others to reinforce his arguments, culminating in the 
1905 publication of an anthology of historical documents purportedly related 
to bushidō. 36 Before this, bushidō was typically supported by vague appeals 
to the Japanese spirit or virtues, but Inoue’s contribution seemed to lend the 
concept considerable historical legitimacy. Liang’s wushidao followed a similar 
trajectory, and China’s Bushidō consisted primarily of historical accounts and 
sayings that demonstrated China’s ancient martial tradition. While Liang was 
conscious of the modernity of both bushidō and wushidao, he was equally 
aware of the advantages of portraying the latter as rooted in ancient tradition if 
it was to become widely accepted.
Two characteristics of China’s Bushidō are especially signiicant in the 
context of later bushidō thought in China. The irst of these was conditioned 
by Liang’s strong interest in the Social Darwinist theories popular throughout 
much of the world at the time. 37 Liang saw an ideology such as bushidō 
primarily as part of the nationalistic spirit created by the Meiji government, 
and therefore as a tool that could be adopted for use in the great evolutionary 
struggle between people and nations. The strengthening of nationalism was 
one of the most signiicant issues for Chinese reformers throughout much of 
the modern period, as can be seen in Sun Yat-sen’s making it the irst of his 
35. Chen (2009): 224-225.




Three Principles of the People. 38 For his part, Liang saw nationalism as “the 
most promising doctrine of the times,” and it became the focal point of his 
historical writings. 39 The second signiicant characteristic is presented more 
clearly in Yang Du’s preface, and concerns the notion that bushidō was based 
largely on Chinese ideas. Here, Yang listed Buddhism and Confucianism, 
referring to the close connection between the Japanese warrior ethic and 
the thought of Wang Yangming. 40 Just as many Japanese theorists sought to 
de-Sinify bushidō by appealing to heterodox teachings, Yang was an early 
example of Chinese attempts to portray bushidō as essentially derivative. The 
Chinese teachings that seemed to be at the heart of bushidō could serve as a 
bridge for introducing a similar martial ethic into China, or could be seized 
upon to criticize the ideology as a corruption of ancient virtues.
Bushidō in the early Republican era 1912-1928
Liang Qichao was already a relatively mature scholar when he arrived in 
Japan to witness the rapid growth of bushidō, and his elite connections meant 
that he engaged with the latest intellectual discourse on the subject. For Yang 
Du and other, younger Chinese who came to study in Japan in the irst decade 
of the twentieth century, exposure to bushidō was similar to that experienced 
by Japanese students and cadets; i.e. bushidō was presented as an ancient and 
unique Japanese spirit that was behind Japan’s recent strength and success. 
This notion was enhanced by Japan’s victory in the Russo-Japanese War of 
1904-05, when people across the world took notice of Japan as the irst non-
Western nation to defeat one of the great powers in a modern war. In contrast 
to the Sino-Japanese War, this latter achievement was primarily credited to a 
difference in spirit between the two sides, and bushidō rode a global wave of 
popularity. 41 The Russo-Japanese War also marked the high point of bushidō 
discourse in Japan before the 1930s, with interest in the subject declining 
considerably during and after the First World War, as popular disillusionment 
with the military and government combined with broader social currents 
towards democracy and internationalism to drive discourse away from 
ostensibly traditional ideals. In spite of this, the slow pace of curriculum reform 
meant that this was also the time when bushidō became irmly established in 
38. Sun Yat-sen (1943).
39. Tang (1996): 34-35.
40. Tsai (2010): 209.
41. See, for example: Holmes and Ion (1980).
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both the military and civilian education systems, and the many Chinese who 
came to Japan to study during this period were thoroughly exposed to bushidō.
Like their Japanese peers, this younger generation did not question the 
historical legitimacy of bushidō. Although aspects of bushidō were seen as useful 
for the Chinese situation, the notion that the ideology was a Meiji-era construct 
was not widely pursued, meaning that Liang’s attempt to “manufacture” a 
Chinese equivalent remained an unusual departure. Furthermore, as Japan 
became increasingly involved on the continent, bushidō became especially 
popular as a tool for understanding Japan’s intentions, as well as reforming 
China. An area in which bushidō had a strong and lasting impact in China 
was in military education, as many leading oficers had undergone training in 
the bushidō-infused environment of Japan’s military academies. One of these 
was the military educator Jiang Baili (1882-1938), who arrived in Japan in 
1900 and graduated at the top of his class at the Japanese Imperial Military 
Academy in 1904. Inluenced by the burgeoning bushidō discourse around 
him, Jiang wrote in 1903 that Japan’s success was due to its ability to combine 
the bushidō tradition with modern science, channelling the strength of both 
East and West. According to Jiang, Japan could serve as a model for China 
in this regard, echoing Liang and others that the cultivation of nationalism in 
China was a most urgent task. 42
Like his contemporaries, Jiang’s bushidō theories also focused on the 
Chinese heritage of the ethic, although Jiang was more interested in the 
inluence of Buddhist thought than Confucian ideals. Jiang pointed out that 
Japanese often claimed that foreigners could not understand bushidō or the 
Japanese spirit, but reasoned that the Japanese could not understand it either. 
This, according to Jiang, was because it came from Zen (Chan) Buddhism. 43 
This view relects the great efforts Japanese promoters of Zen made to tie 
their religion to the increasingly popular bushidō, often portraying Zen as 
“the religion of the samurai.” 44 Although there was no exceptional historical 
connection between the two, the Zen schools, which had been persecuted along 
with other Buddhist sects in the Shinto-dominated environment of the early 
Meiji period, sought patriotic legitimacy and popular acceptance by claiming 
historical ties to the samurai, military, and the unquestionably Japanese ethic of 
bushidō. 45 This method proved effective, and after Confucianism, Buddhism 
42. Wu and Xiaong (1989): 224-225.
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became the most signiicant hook for Chinese students of bushidō to identify 
apparent traces of Chinese inluence.
Japanese and Western interest in bushidō declined after 1914, as Japan 
moved to embrace new types of modernity and the West was absorbed in its 
own conlicts. Chinese writings increased during and after the First World War, 
when Japan became irmly established as the major foreign source of political 
and military interference, but also as the greatest hope for potential aid for 
China’s various competing factions. In spite of growing animosity between the 
two countries deriving from Japan’s imperialistic activities, Japan’s undoubted 
strength meant that it would continue to serve as a model for many in China. 
In this context, while citing bushidō as a uniquely Japanese phenomenon, 
Chinese reformers argued for changes similar to those they observed in Japan. 
For example, having returned to China after further study in Germany, Jiang 
Baili became president of the Baoding Military Academy in 1912, where he 
required cadets to memorize passages of Liang Qichao’s China’s Bushidō. 46
The importance of Japan was also emphasized beyond the military, as 
in a 1916 commentary by the editors of the Tsinghua University Journal, 
describing Japan as proving the necessity for modern educational institutions, 
as the teaching of bushidō in schools was key to strengthening the Japanese 
nation. 47 Similarly, the educator Tang Yikang (dates unknown) wrote in 
1924 that Japan’s wealth and power came from the fact that they were used 
to military things and emphasized the “bushidō lifestyle.” Realizing that this 
would not be enough to increase national wealth after the Restoration, Tang 
wrote, Japan also turned to practical knowledge, which combined with bushidō 
to make Japan strong. 48 The same year, the Qing loyalist scholar Gu Hongming 
(1857-1928) toured Japan on an English-language lecture series that continued 
on into 1925. Speaking on the subject of “Japan and the Reconstruction of 
Chinese Civilization,” Gu drew parallels between English chivalry and 
Japanese bushidō. Just as the English knightly code had been derived from 
French models, Gu argued, the samurai ethic was based entirely on Chinese 
ideals. However, China had undergone drastic change and foreign invasions 
since the height of the Tang Dynasty (618-907), and the purest elements of its 
civilization had been lost. According to Gu, these ideals had been transferred 
to Japan, where they had been preserved into the present. In other words, the 
modern Japanese were the “true Chinese” and their bushidō spirit manifested 
46. Gillin (1970): 839.
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the best of ancient China. 49 While lauding the Japanese for their national spirit 
and modern progress, Gu portrayed them primarily as the curators of superior 
Chinese virtues.
1927 saw the publication of Wang Chaoyou’s (dates unknown) My View of 
Japan (Wo zhi Riben guan), which was perhaps the most positive assessment 
of bushidō by any Chinese writer before 1945. Wang had irst moved to Japan 
in 1905 as an exchange student, and little is known about his personal life other 
than that, following his return to China, he took up a position in the Beiyang 
government based in Beijing. 50 Echoing other writers, Wang admonished his 
countrymen for not devoting suficient energy into the study of Japan, and My 
View of Japan was intended to promote this type of research. According to 
Wang, the lack of understanding of their many commonalities was the cause 
of friction between the two countries, and overcoming them would lead to 
mutual prosperity. Wang portrayed Japan as a model society, due primarily to 
its superior “national character,” which was deined by bushidō. For Wang, 
bushidō was a wholly positive ethic that incorporated important Confucian 
ideals, especially loyalty and ilial piety, combining these with courage and 
reinement: “courageous people are cruel, and graceful people are without 
courage. This is normal. The Japanese people have courage, but are not cruel. 
They have grace, as well as courage. This is due to the quality of their national 
character.” 51 Wang further highlighted Japan’s ability to adopt the best from 
other cultures, arguing that poor people in Japan committed fewer crimes than 
those in other countries due to the fact that they were made virtuous by many 
years of Buddhist and Confucian education. 52 The common inference here was 
that Chinese ethical systems were the basis for Japan’s most admirable aspects, 
and that China therefore already had the tools for self-improvement if it so 
desired. Although Wang’s text was unusual in its wholly positive assessment 
of Japan and bushidō, it enjoyed wide circulation immediately after its initial 
publication, indicating a certain receptiveness for his views at the time.
The most sophisticated treatment of bushidō by a Chinese writer in the 
early twentieth century can be found in the works of Dai Jitao, a member of the 
Guomindang Central Executive Committee and the republican government’s 
Information Minister. Born in Sichuan, Dai had traveled to Japan to study at 
the age of 15 in 1905, returning to China in 1909 after obtaining a degree from 
Nihon University. Also due to his excellent command of Japanese, Dai became 
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Sun Yat-sen’s translator and secretary, giving him great inluence even after 
Sun’s death. Dai moved frequently between China and Japan, negotiating for 
support for the Guomindang, and his views on Japan were highly inluential 
in his homeland. Dai’s irst signiicant text in this context, a 1919 essay titled 
“My View of Japan” (“Wo de Riben guan”), criticized Japan’s aggressive 
policy towards China, while warning his countrymen that irrational hatred of 
the Japanese and rejection of Japan’s successful policies were grave mistakes. 
Also due to his considerable experience in the country and his many personal 
connections, Dai’s writings differentiated between the many Japanese who had 
supported him and his compatriots in their struggles to reform China, and the 
expansionist imperialists who sought to partition and exploit China to Japan’s 
own ends. 53
In his evaluation of Japan, Dai singled out Shinto as a malicious and puzzling 
element in Japan’s development. Contrasting it with the Confucian rationalism 
that supposedly guided China, Dai criticized Shinto as an ancient superstition 
that was becoming increasingly prominent, with the notion of Japan as a divine 
nation being especially dangerous. One of Dai’s other main criticisms of Japan 
was the supposedly violent nature of the traditional “feudal” class structure 
before the Meiji period. According to Dai, the samurai brutally exploited the 
class structure to abuse and even kill those below them in the social order, 
which was entirely opposed to the character of “peace-loving Chinese” society. 
This situation changed, Dai wrote, after Confucianism became inluential from 
the seventeenth century, bringing ideas of benevolence and humanity that 
paciied the cruel samurai and set Japan upon the course to becoming a modern 
and civilized society. Dai also appreciated aspects of the samurai, however, 
arguing that Japan continued to beneit from their spirit of self-sacriice, 
selless loyalty, and—after the introduction of Confucian ideas—compassion. 
In contrast, Dai saw the problems of modern Japan as closely related to the 
loss of samurai virtues as the avaricious former merchant classes became more 
powerful and large corporations began to steer government policy. 54 Dai’s 
concern with negative aspects of Japanese militarism in this essay relected the 
powerful anti-Japanese sentiments in China, but he also believed that Japan 
was changing in the spirit of democratization that deined the Taish  period 
(1912-1926), and that relations between the two countries could be beneicial 
in the long term.
In 1927, Dai made a somewhat disappointing trip to Japan to attempt 
to secure support for the Guomindang. Japan’s involvement in China was 
53. Lu (2004): 80-83.
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becoming considerably more intrusive, but Chiang Kaishek (Jiang Jieshi; 
1887-1975) and other right-wing members of the GMD believed that Soviet 
Russian inluence was the greater threat. As a result, Dai was instructed to 
solicit Japanese aid, and to persuade the Japanese business community that 
the GMD’s priority was to protect business interests. 55 Following this journey, 
and the anti-Communist purges in Shanghai, Dai revisited his 1919 essay, 
expanding it into a full-length book titled On Japan (Riben lun), in which 
the samurai and bushidō were central themes. Here, Dai credited the samurai 
as being entirely responsible for the Meiji Restoration which enabled Japan’s 
modernization, while the commoner classes that made up the vast majority of 
the population stood idly by. 56 As Hatakeyama Kaori argues, Dai portrayed 
the Restoration as a revolution initiated by the elite samurai, rather than an 
uprising of the farmers or lower classes, relecting his anti-communist views. 57 
Accordingly, Dai was responding to the growing Communist challenge 
by providing an apparent example of a positive bourgeois revolution that 
supposedly demonstrated that an elite movement such as the increasingly 
conservative core of the Guomindang was ideally suited to the challenges of 
reforming the country for the good of all members of society.
Dai brought together several themes from his earlier work, arguing that 
the Japanese devoted great resources to studying China, enabling them to gain 
great inluence. In contrast, the Chinese knew very little about Japan, thereby 
leaving them most vulnerable to this potential enemy. 58 Japanese study of 
China had a long history, Dai pointed out, and the adoption of Chinese thought 
in the Tokugawa period had combined to create a unique and powerful spirit 
that contained the best of both societies. According to Dai, the samurai class 
had been heavily inluenced by Confucian ideals of compassion during the Edo 
period, and their bushidō was essentially a “life of blood and tears,” sellessly 
spilling their blood for their lords while crying tears of compassion for the 
farmers below them.” 59 Dai emphasized the inluence of the eighteenth-century 
Confucian Yamaga Sok , who was widely viewed as the “Sage of Bushidō” in 
early twentieth-century Japan. 60 In discussing Yamaga, Dai’s writings relected 
the mainstream bushidō interpretations taught in schools and the military, 
which were often the result of attempts to de-Sinify Confucian ideals and give 
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them legitimacy as native Japanese thought. Like other Chinese thinkers, Dai 
Jitao sought the Confucian (Chinese) roots of bushidō, as these might make 
possible the creation of a similar ideology in China. In this context, the notion 
that the essence of bushidō was to be found in Japanese appropriation of the 
thought of Wang Yangming and Zhu Xi was highly inluential. 61
Dai repeated earlier warnings of the dangers of Japanese militarism, which 
had ancient roots predating China’s “civilizing” inluence. 62 According to 
Dai, Japanese martiality and militarism were not present in Chinese or Indian 
thought, but were purely founded in Japan’s socio-religious superstitions 
centered on the notion of divine authority. 63 At the same time, Dai described 
the inluence of bushidō more positively than in his 1919 article, portraying 
it as the force that gave Japanese thought a vitality that was lacking in China. 
Dai did not question the historical legitimacy of bushidō, but argued that it 
had evolved considerably from its origins as a theory of a social order. In the 
Tokugawa period, bushidō was irst used to describe an ethical theory and 
then became a religious concept based on Shinto. In the Meiji period, bushidō 
absorbed European ideals and became the foundation of Japan’s political 
ethics, Dai wrote, and it was this process that should be thoroughly researched 
by Chinese scholars. 64
The foreword to Dai’s Riben lun was penned by the rightwing Guomindang 
leader Hu Hanmin (1879-1936), indicating the importance of this text. Hu 
described Riben lun as the “crystallization of Dai’s thought” and echoed 
his calls for further study of Japan, which he claimed was culturally and 
geographically much closer to China and hosted ten times as many Chinese 
students as Europe. 65 Hu also warned of the inluence of Moscow and the 
Chinese Communist Party, relecting the pragmatic domestic political reasons 
that drove men aligned with the Guomindang to promote Japan and bushidō. 66 
This positive assessment of Japan was becoming increasingly problematic as 
Japan’s activities in China became more directly interventionist, however, and 
writers on bushidō walked a precarious ideological tightrope.
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Bushidō during the Fifteen Year War
As relations between Japan and China worsened, especially after 
the Manchurian Incident of 1931, attitudes towards Japan and bushidō 
understandably became increasingly negative, although there remained 
a signiicant diversity among interpretations. Internal conlicts, most 
signiicantly between the Guomindang and Communist factions, meant that 
Japanese support was often highly desired and that Japan was not universally 
dismissed. Similarly, the very military and economic strength that underpinned 
Japanese imperialism on the continent meant that Japan could continue to 
serve as a model for emulation in some regards. These continuities were 
especially apparent in military ields, where Japanese technology and drill 
were highly esteemed, also because many Chinese oficers were graduates of 
Japanese institutions or had received instruction from Japanese advisors. At 
the Baoding Military Academy, the Japanese inluence was embodied by Jiang 
Baili’s promotion of bushidō and Japanese methods. Jiang’s many attempts to 
reform the ineficient structure of Baoding ended in his own attempted suicide, 
bringing him great respect among those dissatisied with the new order. After 
this failure and the disillusionment of the 21 demands, Jiang dismissed bushidō 
as a possible instrument for use in China. 67 Jiang’s high opinion of bushidō 
declined further as Japanese interventions in China increased, and by the 1930s 
he had become very critical. In his 1937 The Japanese—One Foreigner’s 
Research (Ribenren—yi ge waiguoren de yanjiu), Jiang warned of Japanese 
duplicity rooted in their martial traditions, for even as Japan protested about 
their national crisis, they prosecuted an offensive war in China. 68
Yan Xishan (1883-1960) was another graduate of the Japanese Imperial 
Military Academy who returned to China after graduating in 1909, having 
experienced the peak of the late Meiji bushidō boom. Like his classmates, Yan 
was convinced of the signiicance of bushidō to Japan’s modern success, and 
especially its effect in mobilizing that nation to support the military in its war 
with Russia. Yan brought these ideas with him to China, where he authored 
a pamphlet arguing that revering the military and adopting a wushidao ethic 
were the only sources of hope if China were to compete with Japan. 69 In the 
turmoil following the 1911 revolution, Yan moved to Shanxi province, which 
he controlled as his largely autonomous ief for over three decades until 
the Communist takeover in 1949. Throughout this tumultuous period, Yan 
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survived rival warlords and regimes through no small amount of diplomatic 
skill, including a constantly shifting relationship with Japan. Partly out of 
pragmatism, but also out of a continuing admiration for Japanese militarism 
from his time there, Yan continued to discuss bushidō in a positive manner 
even as the conlict between the two countries intensiied in the 1930s.
Yan was particularly interested in the inluence of bushidō on the Meiji 
Restoration, considering this event to be the most important turning point 
in Japan’s modern history, and he desired a similar “spiritual” and social 
revolution in China. Even in 1938, only one year after the full-scale invasion of 
China by Japan began, Yan stated that “only 70 years ago, Japan was still but a 
small and weak country that was periodically subject to invasion, and the Meiji 
emperor knew that a restoration was necessary. His Restoration especially 
emphasized the military and proclaimed the bushidō spirit.” 70 According 
to Yan, the “thousands of years of traditional bushidō spirit education are 
demonstrated by the fact that Japanese soldiers do not become prisoners of 
war,” a trope that was irst popularly associated with bushidō during his stay 
in Japan in 1904. 71 As an essentially independent ruler of Shanxi, Yan had 
the power to implement reforms, even if he often failed to follow words with 
actions, and Japan retained its value as one of several potential models even 
during wartime, while the practical necessity of negotiating with the Japanese 
further reinforced his interest in their military culture. Yan beneitted most 
directly from his pro-Japanese views and cultural knowledge after 1945, when 
he was able to convince 15,000 Japanese troops to ight for him in Shanxi even 
after “their” war had ended, and this assistance was vital in Yan’s ability to 
hold out until 1949. 72
Yan’s long-time rival and ally, Chiang Kai-shek, had a similar exposure 
to bushidō during military training in Japan in the last years of the Qing. 
Like Yan, Chiang was deeply impressed by the bushidō in Japanese military 
spiritual education, and later sought to instil a similar spirit of loyalty and 
self-sacriice in his own men at the Huangpu Military Academy. 73 After the 
Manchurian Incident, Chiang expressed concern that Japan’s greatest and most 
destructive weapon in the invasion of China was not a physical weapon, but the 
mental spirit of their troops. This spirit, Chiang claimed, was the bushidō spirit 
comprised of imperial loyalty, patriotism, disregard of death, and a fondness 
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for war. 74 At the same time, Chiang saw bushidō as a possible source of strength 
for China. According to Chiang, the positive accomplishments of bushidō were 
attributable to Wang Yangming’s notion of the unity of thought and action, 
which had given form to bushidō. Before the Meiji period, Chiang argued, 
Japan had learned a great deal from China, and bushidō was part of this cultural 
borrowing. However, bushidō was only a part of the unique Chinese morality 
and warrior spirit, and the Japanese failed to grasp these in their entirety. Most 
signiicantly, Chiang felt, Japanese thinkers had failed to grasp the Confucian 
idea of benevolence, instead placing too much emphasis on martial courage. 
Ultimately, Chiang accused Japan of merely having stolen bushidō from 
China, made it their national spirit, and then turned around and used this same 
ethic to invade China. 75 Chiang’s interpretation of bushidō as misappropriated 
Chinese thought was in line with his nationalistic promotion of Confucianism, 
manifested in his idealistic New Life Movement (Xin shenghuo yundong). 76 
Attributing the positive aspects of Japan’s modernization to Chinese ideals 
while dismissing its militarism as an aberration was a popular device among 
Chinese bushidō theorists at the time.
Criticism of bushidō was also widespread outside of military and political 
circles, especially in public discourse and among left-leaning intellectuals. The 
writer Zhou Zuoren (1885-1967), for example, had witnessed the evolution of 
bushidō from his arrival in Japan as an exchange student in 1906, and became 
increasingly disillusioned as government repression at home and aggressive 
expansion abroad came to dominate the Japanese political agenda. Unlike 
Jiang Baili, Yan Xishan, or Chiang Kai-shek, Zhou arrived in Japan not in 
a military capacity—having failed the physical test required by the Navy—
but as a nominal student of architecture who was in fact free to pursue his 
interests in Japanese history, language, and culture at H sei and Rikky  
universities. 77 This meant that while Zhou was exposed to the popular bushidō 
discourse surging throughout Japan during his six-year stay, he was not 
systematically drilled in the oficially-sanctioned interpretations taught in the 
military academies. Furthermore, Zhou’s career as a writer and scholar meant 
that he moved in more progressive circles in Japan than his peers with ties to 
nationalist organizations such as the Amur River Society.
Zhou became one of the most pro-Japanese thinkers of his generation, with 
his focus irmly on Japan’s arts, literature, and culture, which he compared 
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favourably with the situation in China in the decade after his return in 1911. 
Even back in China, Zhou’s writings relected many of the attitudes among 
contemporary Japanese literary igures at the time, and this extended to 
bushidō. Due to disillusionment with Japan’s military and government, as well 
as the shock of General Nogi Maresuke’s (1849-1912) anachronistic suicide 
by disembowelment following the death of the Meiji emperor, the majority of 
Japanese intellectuals turned away from bushidō and began to look towards 
more progressive ideals such as democracy and internationalism. This resulted 
in a steep decline in popular interest in bushidō—although it remained strong in 
the education system—and the ideology did not begin to recover until the late 
1920s. 78 Accordingly, Zhou did not engage extensively with bushidō during 
this period, although a brief 1919 article on “Various Thoughts from Travels in 
Japan” (“You Riben zagan”) introduced Japanese samurai and geisha, as well 
as examining the inluence of the bushidō spirit on Japan’s national character. 79 
Zhou’s understanding of bushidō focused on aesthetics and humanism, setting 
it apart from the emperor-centered interpretations promoted in the civilian 
and military education systems. In this way, in 1925 Zhou criticized the 
widespread assumption that “loyalty to one’s lord (emperor)” was the essential 
trait of Japan’s national character, instead arguing that this ideology was rooted 
in a combination of Chinese and German thought and used by the Japanese 
government. 80 By this point, Zhou had become disillusioned by the actions of 
Japanese on the continent, as well as political repression within Japan, resulting 
in an attitude that he described as: “lov [ing] what is lovable, hat [ing] what 
is hateful; being both pro-Japanese and anti-Japanese, for that may just be the 
only workable approach.” 81
As bushidō discourse became louder and more directly relevant with the 
rise of Japanese militarism in the 1930s, Zhou addressed the subject in greater 
depth. Like a small number of Japanese critics at the time, Zhou considered the 
bushidō being promoted by the military to be a corruption of a more noble and 
ancient tradition. In his 1935 essay series “Riben guankui,” Zhou discussed the 
famous eighteenth-century incident involving 47 masterless samurai of Ak  
domain who were sentenced to commit suicide after avenging their lord and 
were later celebrated in the story known as A Treasury of Loyal Retainers 
(Chūshingura). Zhou further mentioned 20 Tosa samurai who committed 
suicide in 1868 for attacking French sailors, in accordance with the law and 
78. Benesch (2014): chapter 5.
79. Yu (2010): 53.
80. Lu (2004): 135-136.
81. Lu (2004): 143.
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old samurai practice. In contrast, Zhou condemned the fact that, following 
the assassination of prime minister Inukai Tsuyoshi by soldiers in 1932, none 
of his killers were punished harshly, nor did any of them take responsibility 
by committing suicide like the samurai of old. 82 For Zhou, modern bushidō 
was essentially equivalent to political militarism, and different from the 
aesthetic nature of traditional culture. 83 In 1936, as the situation deteriorated 
further, Zhou wrote on the humanity of traditional bushidō that was being 
lost. Referring to a samurai novel by Tanizaki Jun’ichir  (1886-1965), Zhou 
focused on the solemn and digniied treatment of enemy corpses by the victors 
in a battle, which demonstrated the empathy inherent in traditional bushidō. 84
Neither Zhou nor other Chinese writers during the Fifteen Year War 
questioned the historical legitimacy of bushidō, although the notion that it had 
been altered and even corrupted in the modern period was widespread. At the 
same time, there was general agreement that this modern, militaristic bushidō 
ideology was extremely effective in driving Japan’s imperial expansion, and 
it was perceived as one of Japan’s greatest strengths. Criticism of bushidō 
increased greatly in China as the conlict intensiied, with the points of 
argument largely consistent with earlier interpretations, especially the view 
that the positive elements of bushidō had essentially been taken from Chinese 
thought and religion. The wartime period perhaps best illustrates the inluence 
that politics and conlict had on interpretations of bushidō, and the way in 
which this supposed core aspect of the Japanese “national character” was 
reinvented to suit contemporary expediencies.
Bushidō in the Reform Era
After 1945, interest in bushidō declined in Japan due to its association with 
prewar militarism and the emperor system. Japanese historians who had written 
on the subject during wartime purged their works of references to the emperor, 
instead focusing on examinations of premodern samurai in an attempt to ind 
an earlier, uncorrupted, “true” bushidō. In China, which faced far greater 
internal and external challenges, Japan and bushidō became less immediately 
relevant. For leftists, bushidō was merely one part of the militaristic “fascist” 
ideology that Japan’s leaders had used to wreak destruction upon the peoples 
of East Asia, including their own citizens. For those on the right, continuing 
82. Hatakeyama (2013): 326.
83. Gao (1996): 63-64.
84. Lu (2004): 227.
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accusations of being collaborators with the Japanese, combined with the 
disillusionment resulting from Japan’s defeat, meant that Japan could no 
longer publicly serve as a model in the same way as before. Signiicantly, the 
vast majority of Chinese bushidō promoters during the war with Japan had 
been afiliated with the Guomindang, with some, such as Yan Xishan, holding 
its most powerful positions in the postwar period.
Geopolitical expediencies after the light to Taiwan meant that the 
Guomindang government had to reach an accommodation with Japan, as both 
countries sought cover under the American security umbrella. Furthermore, a 
large number of high-ranking military and civilian oficials in the Republic of 
China had spent time in Japan or worked closely with Japanese advisors, and 
many of these personal relationships survived the conlict intact. Beginning 
in 1949, Japanese oficers were covertly invited to Taiwan to help train 
ROC troops for the planned reconquest of China, an endeavour that was not 
practically supported by the United States. Japanese troops had considerable 
experience ighting Communists in China, and doing so on a shoestring with 
basic materiel, which relected the anticipated invasion of the mainland. 85 
Given the importance of spiritual training in Japanese military training, it 
is likely that this was a signiicant component of the training of Taiwanese 
troops, a suggestion that is supported by Major General Cao Shicheng’s later 
recollection that the strengthening of the GMD’s “martial spirit” was the irst 
of three primary beneits of Japanese training. 86 The Japanese military had 
reined spiritual education to a high degree, and although aspects such as 
imperial loyalty were no longer tenable, bushidō remained a useful ideological 
tool in the postwar. The resilience of positive views of bushidō in Taiwan is 
best illustrated by former ROC president Lee Teng-hui (1923-), whose 2003 
Japanese book A Review of “Bushidō”—the Meaning of Noblesse Oblige 
sought to boost Japan’s morale during the ongoing economic malaise by 
appealing to its warrior spirit. 87
In the People’s Republic of China in the 1950s, bushidō and the emperor 
system were seen as hollow ideologies of a disgraced and defunct order, and 
American imperialism presented a far greater and more immediate threat. 
Immediately following Japan’s surrender, Chinese thinkers on both the left 
and right placed great hope in the reformation of Japan and the thorough 
destruction of the emperor-centered ruling order. In this process, a clear 
85. Kushner (2013): 121-122.
86. Kushner (2013): 146.
87. Lee (2003). Chinese translation by: Hsiao Chih-chiang (“Wushidao” jieti—Zuoren de 
genben. Taipei: Qianwei, 2004).
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distinction was drawn between the Japanese people and their government, with 
the former seen as further victims of the latter. 88 This view was strengthened by 
the tremendous growth of leftist movements in Japan after the war as formerly 
persecuted socialists were joined in their cause by many others disillusioned 
by the war and subsequent American occupation. The perceived leftist threat 
within Japan contributed heavily to the American “reverse course” after 1948, 
when policy began to shift from democratizing and demilitarizing Japan to 
rearming it for the battle against global communism. 89 Chinese anger towards 
Japan in the 1950s was directed primarily at its role as a weapon of U.S. 
imperialism, rather than at the country itself, and there was a widespread 
feeling of solidarity with the Japanese people. 90 As in Japanese academia, 
Chinese historiography was dominated by Marxist models, and class conlict 
replaced bushidō as the determining factor of Japan’s modern trajectory. 
Whereas Dai Jitao had posited the Meiji Restoration as a successful bourgeois 
revolution, Chinese scholars in the 1950s and early 1960s engaged with Soviet 
discourse on Japan, describing the Restoration as merely a slight change or an 
“incomplete bourgeois revolution” at best, with large elements of the “feudal” 
social structure remaining after 1868. 91
In the 1980s, when relations between the two countries again became 
more important, Japan was in the midst of a resurgence of bushidō theories in 
scholarship and popular culture, as “samurai” virtues were frequently portrayed 
as the cultural background for Japan’s economic miracle. This discourse was 
boosted by the appearance of the long-forgotten Nitobe Inaz ’s portrait on the 
5,000-yen note from 1984 to 2004, setting off a spate of republications of his 
work that has continued unabated into the twenty-irst century. 92 This discourse 
also became very inluential in the West, as politicians and business people 
sought to learn from the Japanese corporate structure, and found Nitobe’s 
relatively paciistic and Westernized bushidō interpretation most accessible. 
In contrast, in China, the notion of Japan as a model mixed uncomfortably 
with unresolved issues from the irst half of the century, and bushidō was also 
widely associated with militarism, making the subject far more controversial.
The growing academic freedoms in the reform era combined with 
increasingly assertive and nationalistic activities in Japan to drive rapid 
88. Wu and Xiaong (1989): 238-239.
89. Dower (1999).
90. Wu and Xiaong (1989): 240.
91. Wu and Xiaong (1989): 241-243.
92. Lou Guishu sees this as a sign of increasing militarism in Japan (Lou [2009]: 101).
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growth in Chinese research on Japan from the mid-1980s. 93 Prime minister 
Nakasone Yasuhiro’s oficial visit to the Yasukuni Shrine in 1985 provoked 
harsh reactions throughout East Asia, and controversies over issues such as 
the content of school history textbooks, wartime responsibility, and the status 
of so-called “comfort women” recruited by the Japanese military continue to 
complicate diplomatic relations. In 1987, Li Quanyue, Song Jihuo, and Fan 
Baochen warned of the devastating effect of “corrupt” bushidō over the past 
hundred years, insisting that for the sake of world peace, Chinese, Japanese, 
and people of other nations must endeavour to prevent bushidō from again 
becoming a weapon of a revived Japanese militarism. 94 After prime minister 
Hashimoto Ryūtar ’s visit to Yasukuni on July 29, 1996, Ji Yu placed this in 
a context of Japan’s postwar rearmament, warning of the militarism inherent 
in Japanese history and society following centuries of rule by a martial elite 
embodying the death-focused bushidō spirit. 95
Bushidō features in the majority of texts on Japanese history and culture 
published in China in the last three decades, and it plays an increasingly 
important role in relecting and informing public opinion about Japan. As in 
the period before 1945, reform-era writers on bushidō generally walk a line 
between positive and negative assessments of the ethic, following a broad 
characteristic pattern. Positive evaluations of bushidō tend to focus on its 
supposed Chinese heritage, especially Zen Buddhism and Confucianism, and 
downplay or ignore its role in twentieth-century militarism. Wang Sansan, for 
example, argues that bushidō—founded in Confucianism and Buddhism—was 
the most important element in Japan’s successful modernization. According 
to Wang, China must recognize the tremendous power of Confucianism in 
Japan’s development, and utilize this same power in order to drive its own 
modernization process. 96 Similarly, Su Jizheng’s analysis of Japan’s corporate 
culture attributes a key role to bushidō, which was most strongly inluenced 
by Confucian thought. Su claims that Confucian ideals arrived in Japan from 
Korea in the late third century C.E., and that the Confucian ideal of loyalty 
was emphasized in Japan from this very early point onward. For Su, Japan’s 
success was built on a combination of traditional Chinese ideals and extreme 
bushidō loyalty to the corporation, and that China would have to carefully 
consider these elements and discard those which had proven ineffective. 97 
93. Li (ed.) (2012): 282-283.
94. Li, Song, and Fan (1987): 46.
95. Ji (1996): 15-16.
96. Wang (2008).
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The Samurai Next Door
157
Like Su, Zhang Mingguo, Tang Yongliang, and Yue Yongjie do not address 
militarism in their examinations of the inluence of Confucian-inspired bushidō 
on Japan’s successful modernization and economic success. Zhang focuses on 
the high proportion of former samurai in Japanese universities in the Meiji 
period, while Tang and Yue look at the promotion of practical learning by 
Japanese Confucian scholars. 98
When militarism is addressed in more positive assessments of bushidō, it 
is typically portrayed as a uniquely Japanese element, and often ascribed to the 
inluence of Shinto or emperor-worship, while Chinese thought is presented 
as responsible for morally “positive” events such as the Meiji Restoration or 
Japanese economic success. Wu Si looks to the philosopher Watsuji Tetsur  
(1889-1960) for one solution to the dilemma, which is to posit bushidō as 
two parallel traditions. One, more positive tradition, runs from Yamaga Sok  
through the Restoration heroes to the Meiji period, while a second, death-
focused tradition runs from the Kamakura period through the Warring States 
period and into the militarism of early Showa. 99 This theory is attractive 
to some promoters of bushidō in both Japan and China as it distinguishes 
a beneicial bushidō tradition irmly rooted in Confucian thought from a 
corrupted, militaristic form, thereby allowing the concept to be saved. Positive 
assessments of bushidō in China often repeat the trope of the Japanese as mere 
borrowers from other cultures, and lacking in originality beyond an innate love 
of the martial.
Some critics of bushidō also make use of this argument, describing 
Japanese as having taken Confucianism and other ideals from China, but 
reinterpreted them to their own ends. One common theme also found in texts 
that are not explicitly critical of bushidō is that the fundamental difference 
between Japanese and Chinese Confucianism was that the former focused 
on loyalty (zhong) while the latter stressed benevolence (ren). 100 Wang Zhi, 
for example, argues that while Confucian ideals were already inluential in 
Japan during the Tang dynasty, the emphasis was always on martial rather 
than civil virtues. This was especially the case with bushidō, which was forged 
on the battleield but borrowed Confucian ideas for most of its content when 
it was codiied. Wang argues that this “twisted despotic way” that valued 
war was completely different from Chinese Confucianism. 101 Although the 
samurai weakened during the centuries of Tokugawa peace, Wang writes, 
98. Zhang (1992); Tang and Yue (2004).
99. Wu (2012): 155.
100. See, for example: Gu (2004): 82; Sha (1995): 46.
101. Wang (2012): 36.
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the militaristic nature of their ethical writings presented the possibilities for 
militarism when Japan met new challenges in the modern period. 102 This 
view is perhaps most explicit in the work of Lou Guishu, one of the most 
proliic recent scholars of bushidō in China. According Lou, bushidō was most 
strongly inluenced by Zen, Confucianism, and Shinto. While Zen lent the 
samurai courage and took their fear of death, and Confucianism furnished the 
philosophical, ethical, and political structure for peacefully ruling the country, 
Shinto and its attendant emperor-worship were responsible for the militarism 
of the ideology. 103 Similarly, Xiang Jie picks up the popular theory that bushidō 
was little more than a “practical ethic” given structure by Confucian thought 
in the Edo period. In contrast, Xiang describes Shinto as a militaristic religion 
lacking the compassionate character of other faiths, arguing that bushidō was 
removed from its Confucian roots in the Meiji period and transformed into an 
ethic of “unconditional sacriice for the emperor,” becoming the spiritual core 
of modern militarism. 104 Gao Changfeng describes bushidō as having gone 
through three stages, the second of which involved the thorough adoption of 
Confucian thought to “perfect” the ethic in the Edo period. The third period 
from the end of the Edo period on, however, saw the development of an 
“anti-Confucian, anti-Mencian bushidō” that prescribed absolute loyalty to 
the emperor and was a “cruel and tyrannical way that worshipped ‘insanity 
(kuangqi).’” 105
Another approach found in critical assessments of bushidō is to gloss over 
any potential Chinese heritage, portraying bushidō as one with militarism and 
a wholly Japanese development. In this vein, scholars such as Huang Zhen and 
Cao Lü trace the origins of these ideals—as well as Japan’s “national aggressive 
and expansionist political and cultural identity”—to Japan’s geography as an 
island nation. 106 Wang Fuchun attributes Japan’s aggression to the inluence 
of Shinto and the combined elements of emperor-worship and the notion of 
a “divine nation,” while positing the ancient ethic of bushidō as inextricably 
tied to militaristic expansionism. In the modern period, Wang argues, “the 
evil expansionism of bushidō became the core of the morality of the modern 
Japanese nation,” promoting “extreme foolish loyalty to the emperor” that 
acted like a drug upon many Japanese. 107 Sha Lin sees bushidō as a uniquely 
102. Wang (2012): 42.
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Japanese spirit of aggression, pointing out that Yamaga Sok  appropriated 
Confucian concepts in a nationalistic manner. Sha argues that Confucianism 
had little inluence on bushidō beyond supplying it with terminology, and 
focuses instead on the character of bushidō as a Japanese ethic of cruelty 
and aggression. 108 The historical evidence supports this line of reasoning to a 
certain extent, as Yamaga’s works were selected by Inoue Tetsujir  and other 
modern promoters of bushidō due to Yamaga’s Japan- and emperor-centered 
ideas, rather than his views on samurai ethics.
While their interpretations may differ considerably, most Chinese writers 
on bushidō in the reform era rely primarily on three texts for their theoretical 
framework: Ruth Benedict’s 1946 anthropological study The Chrysanthemum 
and the Sword, Dai Jitao’s Riben lun, and Nitobe Inazo’s Bushido: The Soul 
of Japan. This corpus sets Chinese bushidō discourse apart from that in most 
other countries, especially Japan and the Anglophone world. While Nitobe’s 
work is the most popular book on the subject worldwide, outside of China, 
Dai’s writings are largely unknown and Benedict’s theories on Japan as a 
“shame culture” have lost much of their former inluence. The popularity of 
The Chrysanthemum and the Sword in China is signiicant given its origins as 
a wartime commission from the U.S. military to help understand their primary 
enemy at the time, and relects the close association of bushidō with Japan’s 
twentieth-century activities in China. Zhang Ke, Gao Xiaoyan, and La Yanzhen 
approach bushidō as the primary source of modern Japanese militarism, and cite 
Benedict to argue that bushidō morality did not follow Confucian or Buddhist 
doctrine, but was rather a singular Japanese stream that was simultaneously the 
nation’s strength and weakness. 109 While Benedict herself criticized bushidō 
as “a term popularized during this century to designate traditional Japanese 
ideals of conduct,” and a “publicist’s inspiration,” Chinese translations of her 
work tend to gloss over these indications that bushidō is essentially a modern 
invention. 110 For example, a 2012 edition by Beijing’s Gold Wall Press loses 
much of this nuance of Benedict’s passage on bushido. Furthermore, the 
glossary deines bushido as having its origins in the Kamakura period before 
being bolstered by Confucian and Buddhist thought in the Tokugawa age to 
create an ethic of absolute loyalty to one’s lord. 111 This explanation of bushidō 
is an addition not found in Benedict’s original text, and, in contradicting her 
108. Sha (1995): 45-47.
109. Gao and La (2006): 81; Zhang (2012): 1.
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111. Benedict and Ru (trans.) (2012): 203-205, 268.
Oleg Benesch
160
statement on bushidō, relects the strength of popular views of the subject in 
China.
With regard to Nitobe, whose relatively paciistic bushidō has been the 
most inluential interpretation in Japan and the West, Lou Guishu and other 
Chinese scholars have accused him of beautifying bushidō and giving spiritual 
strength to the military. According to Lou, Nitobe defends militarism and 
focuses on loyalty and dedication while “deliberately” covering up bushidō’s 
path to “murder and war.” 112 Nitobe’s relationship with militarism has been 
subject to considerable debate in the scholarship, and his critics often point 
to his activities as a colonial oficial in Taiwan, as well as a controversial and 
ill-fated overseas tour on which Nitobe attempted to defend Japan’s activities 
in China to increasingly hostile audiences in 1932-33. 113 Lou’s harsh criticism 
is much the exception in China, however, and Nitobe’s work is most often 
encountered as an authoritative explanation of the Japanese character and 
society.
Chinese publications on bushidō during the reform era have generally 
followed patterns established in the early twentieth century. The vast majority 
of texts treat bushidō as an ancient tradition, and acknowledgement of its 
modern character is rare. There is a broad consensus that Confucianism and 
Zen provided the ethical structure for bushidō, and there is a tendency to ascribe 
the positive characteristics of bushidō to these “Chinese” thought systems. Xi 
Jiabei, for example, credits this Zen-Confucian bushidō with Japan’s ability 
to resist opium addiction, arguing that China was less able to maintain these 
ideals. 114 Luo Wei and Lei Huixiong compare traditions of policing in China 
and Japan, where the samurai supposedly followed a “unity of knowing and 
doing” bushidō that was inluenced by Zen and Confucianism, especially the 
teachings of Wang Yangming. According to Luo and Lei, this ethic continued 
to inluence police practice, and they hope to “absorb the advanced culture 
of police thinking to promote the Chinese police culture construction.” 115 
Texts that portray a typically Chinese-inspired bushidō in a positive light 
also tend to neglect modern militarism, or to ascribe this to the supposedly 
corrupting effect of indigenous Japanese religious thought. Similarly, Chinese 
writers focusing on negative aspects of bushidō, such as militarism, suicide, 




115. Luo and Lei (2011).
The Samurai Next Door
161
bushidō. Ultimately, national concerns and unresolved issues from the early 
twentieth century continue to inluence bushidō theories in the reform period.
Conclusion
China has played an important role in bushidō discourse from its 
beginnings at the end of the nineteenth century, relecting the broader trends 
in a Japan seeking a new, “national” identity between China and the West. A 
central theme of this early bushidō was the de-Siniication of Confucian and 
Buddhist ideas in line with the increasingly nationalistic agenda after the Sino-
Japanese War. In contrast, Chinese studies of bushidō sought precisely these 
supposed Chinese roots, as bushidō was credited with Japan’s modernization 
and military success, which served as the most immediately relevant model 
for Chinese reformers. These contradictory aims meant that Chinese scholars 
began to form their own bushidō theories, stressing the Chinese elements of 
the ethic that could be “revived” most easily, while dismissing problematic 
characteristics of bushidō as Japanese corruptions. Even those ideals that 
were not necessarily considered desirable by modern Chinese scholars, 
including aspects of Confucianism and Buddhism, were still emphasized for 
nationalistic reasons as having had a formative inluence on bushidō, and this 
defense of China’s intellectual heritage for its own sake attests to the growth of 
nationalistic concerns in modern China.
In spite of these signiicant continuities, just as the popularity and content 
of bushidō discourse in modern Japan has changed considerably in response to 
political, economic, and military conditions, views and uses of bushidō in China 
have evolved along with national and geopolitical developments. Admiration of 
Japan’s economic and military strength in the late Qing was joined by concern 
regarding these same factors after the issuing of the 21 Demands in 1915, and 
writings on bushidō echoed these shifts. As nationalistic and emperor-centered 
bushidō interpretations became dominant in Japan during the Fifteen-Year 
War, the belief that Shinto-based bushidō drove Japanese militarism became 
increasingly prevalent in China as an explanation of the reasons behind the 
Japanese invasion. These prewar and wartime currents have also driven the 
great resurgence of bushidō interest in China in the reform era, and the three 
most inluential texts on the subject are all products of this earlier period. In 
recent decades, scholarship on bushidō has generally sought to understand 
Japanese actions in light of growing military strength and assertiveness in both 
countries, to understand elements of Japan’s economic success as a model for 
China, or to boost nationalism by elucidating the respective Chinese (positive) 
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and Japanese (negative) sources of bushidō. The intellectual history of bushidō 
in China over the course of the long twentieth century shows that, for many, 
studying the proverbial enemy is also a means of knowing and deining one’s 
self.
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